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THE JUDICIARY AND EDUCATION REFORM:
A REASSESSMENT
JUDITH AREEN*
The past 20 years has experienced increased judicial activism in
the field of education. The. desegregation cases of the 1950's and
1960's evolved into the school finance decisions of the early 1970's.
Professor Areen examines the judicial attempt to provide equal
educational opportunity, and questions the. basic premises upon
'which judicial intervention is based. The author concludes that
judicial efforts to equalize educational opportunity have been mis-
directed. The goals sought to be attained by judicial intervention
must be. reconsidered before an effective education can be pro-
vided for all.
For years the judiciary was content to leave control of education
almost exclusively in the hands of state legislators and administrative
officials.' But beginning with Brown v. Board of Education2 in 1954, the
* A.B., 1966, Cornell University; LL.B., 1969, Yale University. Associate Professor of
Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
1 Public schooling did not spawn much litigation because compulsory attendance laws
did not emerge until after 1850 and few people attended public school before that time.
As late as 1910 less than nine percent of the eligible children finished high school.
BUREAU OF CEtNSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERc E, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES COLONIAL TIMES TO 1957 Table H 223-33, at 207 (1960). Today, by con-
trast, over 90 percent of the eligible children attend at least one year of high school and
80 percent graduate. BURAU OF CENSUS, UNITED STATES DFP'T OF COMmERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1971 Tables 192-93, at 124-25 (92d ed. 1971).
A few state courts held there were some limits to the states' power to operate and
compel attendance at public schools. See, e.g., Trustees of Schools v. People, 87 Ill. 303,
29 Am. R. 55 (1877) (inability to pass grammar examination no bar to pupil's admission
to public school); State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393
(1891) (reinstatement of child ordered despite refusal to study grammar); School Bd.
Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 2, 103 P. 578 (1909) (reinstatement of child ordered
despite refusal to participate in music class). Most state courts, however, upheld the right
of school authorities to prescribe certain courses. See, e.g., Samuel Benedict Memorial
School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36 S.E. 920 (1900); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379,
61 Am. Dec. 256 (1854); Guernsey v. Pitldn, 32 Vt. 224, 76 Am. Dec. 171 (1859). The
discretionary power of school authorities to regulate pupil conduct in disciplinary mat-
ters has also been recognized. See Salem Community School Corp. v. Easterly, 275 N.E.2d
317 (Ind. App. 1971); Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31, 8 N.E. 708 (1886) (suspension
of student for refusal to study music constitutes act within discretion of school board);
Tanton v. McKinney, 226 Mich. 245, 197 N.W. 510 (1924).
On several occasions, the Supreme Court cautioned states with respect to their con-
trol of education. For example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court held that states
could not force students to attend public schools, while in West Virginia State Board
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judiciary began repeatedly to intervene in this previously sacrosanct
area. Cases involving a variety of issues were considered, with three is-
sues receiving particular attention: 1) racial integration of schools; 2)
fair distribution of public funds among schools and school districts; and
3) allocation of public resources to nonpublic schools.' Each of these
judicial forays was initiated in response to groups who claimed to speak
for the best interests of the children involved. These groups also claimed
that by granting the actions they requested, the courts would promote
equality of educational opportunity. But their claims now seem in doubt.
With the benefit of hindsight and the aid of new social science data,
the first part of this article will survey the extent to which the three
major types of intervention have in fact promoted equality of education-
al opportunity. The second part will then explore what future judicial
measures, if any, might best further that goal.
LOOKING BACx
THE QUEST FOR RACIAL INTEGRATION
Nearly 19 years have passed since the Supreme Court declared in
Brown that "in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate
but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently
unequal." Yet debate continues to rage regarding implementation of the
Brown mandate. The debate does not focus for the most part on what
Professor Alexander Bickel has termed the "minimal rule" of Brown -
that state sponsored segregation is unconstitutional. Brown's minimal
rule was soon followed by other decisions outlawing state sponsored
segregation in everything from restaurants to golf courses.6 There was
of Education v. Barnette the Court held that students could not be forced to salute the
flag in violation of the first and fourteenth amendments. See West Virginia State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639-42 (1943); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
535 (1925). For the most part, however, the Court did not interfere with the way in
which states operated public schools.
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
3 Cases involving these three issues are now pending before the Supreme Court. See
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. granted, 404 U.S. 1036
(1972) (No. 71-507) (integration); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), prob. juris. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S.
Jan. 22, 1973) (No. 72-694) (tax credits for parents of students in nonpublic schools);
Rodriguez v. San Antonio School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam),
prob. juris. noted, 406 U.S. 966 (1972) (No. 71-1332) (resource allocation).
4 347 U.S. at 495.
5 A. Bicma., THE S PREME CouRT AND Tm THEA OF PRoGREss 118 (1970).
6 See, e.g., Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (per curiam) (segregated seating
facilities in courtroom); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(segregation of restaurant located in public building); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350
U.S. 879 (1955) (mem.) (segregated public golfing facilities).
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wide-spread resistance to Court mandates, for a time of course, but cer-
tainly the overall public consensus, as demonstrated by the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,7 has been to support this aspect of the Brown mandate.
Rather, the current debate focuses on whether the reasoning of the
Brown line of cases should be extended to ban all school desegregation,
whatever its causes. There were after all intimations in the Brown opin-
ion that segregated schools are per se inferior.8 But social science studies
have not provided much support for this extension of Brown.
In 1965, the Coleman report9 appeared to lend some support to the
integrationist position.'" Commissioned by Congress, this landmark sur-
vey did confirm the Court's holding that the Plessy v. Ferguson" doc-
trine of "separate but equal" would not suffice to improve the educa-
tional opportunities available to disadvantaged or minority students when
it demonstrated that school facilities had little if any impact on student
achievement. 12 The Coleman report further showed that the only factor
which was significantly tied to achievement was the socio-economic
background of a student's classmates. 13 For example, the report found
that while the average northern black sixth grader was about 18 months
behind the average white sixth grader on tests of verbal ability, reading
comprehension, and arithmetic skill, black sixth graders attending 50
percent to 75 percent white schools were only about 12 months behind.' 4
But as the Kiesling article documents earlier in this Symposium, sub-
sequent studies revealed that busing black students into white schools
did not necessarily raise their test scores.15 The Coleman report had un-
covered a correlation, in other words, but one that apparently did not
involve a simple cause and effect relationship. 16
742 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975a-75d, 2000a to 2000h-6 (1970).
8 The Court quoted with approval a statement by a lower court that the detrimental
consequences of school segregation were merely increased, and not caused, when the
segregation was sanctioned by law. 347 U.S. at 494.
9 OFFIcE OF EDUC., UNITED STATES DV'T OF HEALTH, EDUc. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF
EDUCATioNAL OPPORTuNTY (1966). The Coleman report was one of the largest social
science research projects in history; 570,000 students and 60,000 teachers were surveyed,
while information on facilities available in 4,000 schools was gathered in elaborate detail.
ON QuALITY oF EDUCAnI NAL OPPORTuNrY 5 (F. Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
10 See OFFIcE OF EDuc., supra note 9, at 28-29.
"1163 U.S. 537 (1896).
12 See OF cE OF EDUC., supra note 9, at 316.
1Iid.
14See Jencks, Busing-The Supreme Court Goes North, N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1972,
§ 6 (Magazine), at 118, col. 5 (based on Jencks reanalysis of Coleman report data).
15 Kiesllng, The Value to Society of Integrated Education and Compensatory Educa--
tion, 61 GRo. L.J. 857, 863 (1973).
16The problem of distinguishing correlations from cause reoccurs throughout the
area of education statistics. For example, the Coleman report found a small but statistical-
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There are several possible responses to these revelations. One, adopted
by Kiesling, is to qualify the significance of the social science findings.
Thus, as he points out, achievement tests are "potentially dangerous
guides to social policy" because they do not measure all the valuable
aspects of education.1' A more affirmative response is to question why
the findings should ever have been thought to be dispositive of the issue
in the first place. In other words, the same constitutional and moral rea-
sons that justified Bro'wn initially may well provide a sufficient basis for
future integration orders, whatever the findings on academic achieve-
ment. The later court opinions prohibiting segregated golf courses or
restaurants, for example, did not require proof that the people involved
would be happier or more productive. The social science findings there-
fore need not settle the case for more integration.' 8 They do, however,
demonstrate that integration orders to date have done little, if anything,
to improve equality of educational opportunity to the extent that we
can now measure it.
THE FAULTY IETAPHOR
If the academic world did not provide sufficient statistical support for
the fight for more racial integration of schools, it almost single-handedly
nurtured the next stage of judicial opportunity: the resource revolution.
The inequalities of present patterns of resource allocation appear to have
been mentioned first in a short article published by Arthur Wise in
1965.19 Of the flood of articles, dissertations and books which followed,
undoubtedly the most influential was Private Wealth and Public Educa-
tion"20 published in 1970 by Professors John Coons, William Clune, and
Stephen Sugarman. The three scholars there argued that current patterns
of distributing funds to school districts should be declared unconstitu-
ly significant difference in mean achievement between schools with experienced and in-
experienced teachers. But in fact the cause and effect relationship involved turns out
to reflect the opposite of what one might expect. It was not that experienced teachers
were in fact more competent, rather they appear to have used their bargaining power
to transfer to schools with overachieving students. See Jencks, The Coleman Report and
the Conventional Wisdom, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUcATONAL OPPoRTuNiTY 82-83 (F.
Mosteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972).
17 Iiesling, supra note 15, at 877.
18 Other data may be relevant here. Southern black family income rose from 46 per-
cent of the Southern white family average in 1959 to 57 percent ten years later, Jencks,
supra note 14, at 120, col. 5. None of this can be attributed directly to desegregation,
for few of the blacks who attended desegregated schools had reached the labor force
by 1969. Nonetheless the gain may well reflect the fact that Brown has wrought a con-
siderable transformation of the political and social mores of the South. Id. at 121.
19 See Wise, Is Denial of Equal Educational Opportunity Constitutional?, 13 ADMIN-
ISTRATOR'S NoTEaooK 1 (1965).
20 J. COONS, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRVATE WEALTH & PUBLIc EDUCATION (1970).
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tional if they make the quality of public education a function of wealth
other than the total wealth of the state.21
This argument was accepted by the California Supreme Court in Ser-
rano v. Priest22 in 1971. In the words of the attorneys for the state of
Texas in Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,2" the
Serrano-like case now pending before the Supreme Court, "rarely, if
ever, in the history of the Republic has a novel idea proceeded in such
a short time from announcement by imaginative scholars to enshrine-
ment in the Constitution of the United States." 24
Perhaps more remarkable, however, is the fact that Serrano-like cases
swept the country with little or no challenge to the questionable premise
on which they were built.25 Most Cases, that is, simply assumed that
quantity of funding relates directly to quality of schooling. These cases
used a simple factory model: money was the input and educated stu-
dents the output. The weakness in this approach, however, was that so-
cial scientists had for some time proven this simplistic input-output
model faulty. In the words of the Coleman report:
Differences in school facilities and curriculum, which are the major
variables by which attempts are made to improve schools, are so
little related to differences in achievement levels of students that,
with few exceptions, their effects fail to appear in a survey of this
magnitude.26
21 Id. at 304.
225 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
23 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971) (per curiam), prob. juris. noted, 406 U.S. 966
(1972) (No. 71-1332).
24 Brief for Appellants at 8, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, No.
71-1332 (U.S, filed Apr. 17, 1972).25See Hollins v. Shofstall, Civil No. 253,652 (Super. Ct. Ariz., June 1, 1972); Cald-
well v. Kansas, Civil No. 50,616 (Dist. Ct. Kan., Aug. 30, 1972).26 OrIcE OF Evuc., supra note 9, at 316. Similarly, an analysis of Project Talent, an
earlier survey of 5,000 high school students, found that when impoverished high schools
were compared with schools that spent twice as much, scores of students in rich schools
were no higher than those of students in the poor schools. See C. JENcKs, M. SMITH, H.
AcLAND, M. BANE, D. ConaN, H. Gizms, B. HEYNs & S. MlcIaMLoN, INEQUALiTY: A RE-
ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT OF FAMILY AND SCMOOLING IN AMERICA 94 (1972). At the ex-
treme there is of course a relationship: no money means no school. Evidence indicates
that when schools are closed, learning drops. Furthermore, disadvantaged students would
probably fall even more behind their advantaged classmates if only family education
was available. Thus, in Holland during World War II when many elementary schools
were closed, the IQ scores of children entering one secondary school after the war
dropped about seven points. When schools were closed in Prince Edward County dur-
ing the early 60's in order to avoid court desegregation orders, black children who did
not attend school for several years scored substantially lower than most black children
of their age. Similarly New York City reported a drop in test scores the spring follow-
ing the fall 1968 teachers' strike. Id. at 87.
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The input-output issue was not resolved in Serrano because the case
reached the California Supreme Court on demurrer. Hence the court
merely assumed a direct relationship between quality and money for
the purpose of ruling on the propriety of the demurrer.2 7 Proof of the
relationship is being tested only now at the trial level.28
Professor Levin similarly dismisses this key issue with only a foot-
note,29 before plunging into a lengthy discussion of the technicalities of
present patterns of school finance and possible alternatives. Despite her
disclaimer, however, she later appears to assume the relationship in her
discussion of ideal financing schemes. She argues for example that state
aid formulas "should... recognize the high cost of educating... the
educationally disadvantaged student," 30 a proposition which seems rea-
sonable only if one assumes that more money can indeed provide more
quality.3'
Professor Levin also asserts that the Serrano line of cases have all held
that "the level of spending for a child's education may not be a function
of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole." I2 In fact most
decisions, including Rodriguez, the case now pending before the Su-
preme Court, use the phrase "quality of education" rather than "spend-
ing" in stating what it is that may not be a function of wealth as a
whole.33 The opinions then, it is true, focus on "spending" in fashioning
orders, but this is because of the questionable implicit assumption that
"spending" and "quality of education" are interchangeable concepts.
To be sure, social science findings concerning the relationship between
spendipg and quality of education should not necessarily be conclusive
on the matter of resource allocation. While they may cast doubt on the
legal theory used in Serrano and Rodriguez, basic notions of fairness and
justice nonetheless may justify reduction of extreme interdistrict dis-
parities in school expenditure levels. Judicial support for this view can
be found in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw3 4 where the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Constitution requires public
officials to reduce disparities in the provision of municipal services to
27 See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601 n.16, 487 P.2d 1241, 1253 n.16, 96 Cal. Rptr.
601, 613 n.16 (1971).
28 See id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
.29 See Levin, Alternatives to the Present System of School Finance: Their Problems
and Prospects, 61 Gao. LJ. 879, 880 n.3 (1973).
30 Id. at 925.
-. 4 See note 26 supra. Kiesling also discusses the relationship between money and
quality of education. Kiesling, supra note 15, at 866-71.
:'.p2 Levin, supra note 29, at 895-96.
• 3 See 337 F. Supp. at 285.
94 437 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1971), aff'd en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972).
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black and white citizens. 35 In Hawkins, no claim was made that equallY-
ing services-which included street lighting and sewage disposal-would
in some way change the behavior or future earning power of the citizens
involved; rather proof of the existence of a correlation between race and
the level of services provided was considered sufficient to trigger applica-
tion of the equal protection clause.83
Significantly, one of the post-Serrano opinions challenged inequality
of school "inputs" alone. In Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,37 the court re-
phrased the Serrano standard to hold "the level of spending may not be
a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole." 38
Whether this revised standard will prove more justiciable in light of
the formidable proof problems involved in resource challenges 9 remains
to be seen. But the fact remains that Serrano type cases whether based
on spending alone or on quality-whatever that means-will apparently
do little to improve the education provided in public schools.40
THE PRIVATE SCHOOL DILEMMA
No examination of the judiciary's role in public education is complete
without consideration of judicial involvement in the private school
sector which presently serves one out of every eight children in elemen-
tary school.41 Unfortunately, because private schools are overwhelming-
ly sectarian, courts and commentators tend to approach legal issues in-
volving nonpublic schools as church-state conflicts. As a consequence,
85 Id. at 1292.
36 See id. at 1287, 1292.
87 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
88 Id. at 872.
39 Hawkins involved discrimination based on race rather than income. Protection has
been extended to the poor when certain fundamental rights are at issue. See, e.g., Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1965) (right to vote without paying Poll
tax); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1953) (right to counsel on appeal). Whether
the amount of public funds spent on education will qualify as such a fundamental right
therefore remains an open question.
An alternative approach which might prove more fruitful in the long run would be t o
challenge the statutes which link allocation of school funds to district wealth on the
grounds that the classification used is so arbitrary as to violate the rational purpose test
of the fourteenth amendment.
Either approach is subject to the objection that it is district wealth rather than family
wealth which is at issue, and the two are not interchangeable because manypoor families
live in rich districts. See notes 53-55 infra and accompanying text.
40 A recent article suggests Serrano cases may even exacerbate some current problems
by increasing the trend toward statewide bargaining units for teachers and the con-
comitant loss of local control over local schools. See Simon, The Scbool Finance De-
cisions: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems, 82 YArn LJ. 409 (1973).
41 U.S. DEP'T oF HEALTH, EbUc. & War.rAIm, DiaGsr op EDnucAox STATISTICS 21 (1969).
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the overall impact of such decisions upon educational opportunity gen-
erally has been ignored.
In fact, private schools bear significantly on the question of integration.
The United States Commission on Civil Rights found that in 1960 nearly
40 percent of the central city white elementary students in 15 large met-
ropolitan areas attended predominantly white nonpublic schools.4 2 Be-
cause most nonpublic schools are sectarian, at least in the North, it is
therefore apparent that segregation involves religious as well as racial
questions.
Nonpublic schools also are inextricably related to the question of re-
source allocation since they provide education to substantial numbers
of children who would otherwise be supported entirely out of public
tax funds. Not surprisingly, the spectre of large numbers of private
school shutdowns in the face of rising school costs has prompted tax-
payers of many faiths to favor providing some aid to these students.
Significantly, both major party candidates in the 1972 presidential cam-
paign endorsed the concept of aid to parochial schools.43
Unlike the groups favoring integration or resource allocation, sup-
porters of aid to nonpublic schools in the post-Brown era initially focused
their efforts on state legislatures. They succeeded in obtaining passage
of several laws which provided for direct aid to nonpublic schools. The
first challenges to these new statutes were heard by the Supreme Court
in the spring of 1971 when the Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,44 struck
down Pennsylvania and Rhode Island aid statutes as unconstitutional
violations of the separation of church and state.45 This past fall the Court
similarly affirmed a lower court opinion holding unconstitutional an
Ohio statute which attempted to surmount the Lemon barrier by reim-
bursing parents of nonpublic school children rather than funding the
schools directly.4 Recently, however, a three judge federal district court
in New York upheld state income tax credit for a portion of the tuition
paid by students in nonpublic schools, despite a dissent which argued
there is no economic difference between such tax credits and the Ohio
parent reimbursement scheme previously rejected by the judiciary.47
42 U.S. CoMVXm'N ON CiVIL RicTs, RAcIAL ISOLATION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS table 8, at
39 (1967).
43 See, e.g., Shannon, For God and Mr. Nixon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 17, 1972, at 35, col.
1; N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1972, at 36, col. 6; id. Aug. 21, 1972, at 21, col. 5; id. Aug. 18,
1972, it 37, col. 6.
44 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
45 Id. at 607-08, 610.
46 Wolman v. Essex, 342 F. Supp. 399, 403 n.3 (SD. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 41 U.S.L.W.
3182 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1972) (No. 71-1664).
47 Committed for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 350 F. Supp. 655
,(S.D.N.Y. 1972), prob. wins. noted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3409 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) (No. 72-694).
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The position which the Supreme Court takes with respect to tax cred-
its, therefore, will be a critical factor in determining not only the fu-
ture of nonpublic schools, but distribution of access to and the benefits
of nonpublic schools. It does seem apparent that a voucher or credit of
only $100 or $200 will for the most part directly benefit only the chil-
dren now enrolled in nonpublic schools, most of whom are white, from
middle or upper income families, and Catholic. In fact, only a program
which provided enough funding, whether by parent reimbursement
statutes, vouchers, or tax credits, to enable poor and middle income
parents of all faiths to enroll in the nonpublic schools of their choice-
including new schools they might form-could avoid benefiting a pre-
dominantly sectarian class of schools. It was on this basis that a three
judge federal panel in Ohio recently rejected a tax credit scheme.4
The Supreme Court, however, may be persuaded more by form-or
possibly taxpayer pleas-than economic wisdom 49 or concepts of equal
opportunity. The nonpublic school aid issue therefore remains a loop-
hole which not only may not help but may in fact undermine efforts to
increase equality of educational opportunity.
LoomG FoRwARD
After almost two decades of judicial involvement in the quest for
more equal educational opportunity, the basic problems appear to re-
main untouched. No decisions to date have gone to the heart of the prob-
lem of providing a better education for a given child in a particular
classroom, a better teaching situation for most teachers, or a more re-
sponsive school administration for most parents. The increasing involve-
ment of the judiciary in the issues of racial integration, resource alloca-
tion, and nonpublic school aid seems to have done little to provide more
equal educational opportunities for the children involved. Certainly
48 Kosydar v. Wolman, 41 U.S.L.W. 2348 (S.D. Ohio, Dec. 29, 1972).
49 Professor Paul Freund has observed:
A voucher plan providing for limited grants would simply be a variation
in form from aid directed to pupils and parents. But a voucher plan as
conceived by some proponents of new departures in education would pro-
vide total-cost grants per pupil that would enable a family to broaden its
range of choice to include a variety of educational enterprises, old and new.
Such a full payment plan, whereby a voucher would be usable at public,
private, church-related, cooperative, and other experimental kinds of schools,
might be viewed as a measure whose principal impact would not be on
church-related Schools but on a significantly wider, constituency. In this
respect a full-cost voucher' plan would differ in its effect from direct sub-
sidies or fiscal supplements to families for non-public school education.
Freund, Public Aid for Church-Related Education: Federal Constitutional Problems
97-98, in OrrIcE oF EDUC., U.S. DE.P'T OF HEALTH, EDuc. & WELFARE, LEGAL AND COX-
sTITUTSONAL PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NONPmULIC SCHOOLS 101-02 (1971):
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social science findings have cast doubt on most recent judicial activity
by demonstrating that neither equalization of facilities nor busing will
raise significantly the test scores of disadvantaged children. Even more
discouraging is the finding of a study conducted by Professor Jencks
and his colleagues at Harvard that even if test scores were changed there
would be little reduction in the disparities of adult income, because
there appears to be little relationship between school achievement and
an individual's adult income.50
The charge of failure is difficult to make, however, because the groups
involved have been pursuing important goals, albeit not education re-
form per se. Thus, the integrationists seek increased racial harmony; the
resource allocationists see a more equitable distribution of school re-
sources; and the church school enthusiasts seek preservation of religious
liberties. But progress on these fronts should not be confused with move-
ment in basic education reform.
At a minimum, the weight of current evidence demonstrates the need
to reevaluate the focus of litigation allegedly aimed at improving the
quality of educational opportunity available to the disadvantaged-or to
all children for that matter. Too often schools and children are used as
means to achieve some long term end. Thus, students have been bused
allegedly to achieve a variety of long term goals ranging from the les-
sening of racial prejudices to the development of higher adult incomes.
Social science data suggest, however, that school reform should be an
end in itself; the ability to control more long term changes in behavior
is simply too doubtful at present to justify any other focus.5 1
It is ironic that in a country which is supposedly very child centered,
children are in fact not given much protection by legal or legislative
policies. Why should it ever have been considered necessary to produce
higher test scores to justify providing all children with decent school
buildings and competent teachers? They should be entitled to this dnd
50 C. JENcKs, supra note 26, at 8, 220-25.
51 None of the evidence we have reviewed suggests that school reform can
be expected to bring about significant social changes outside the schools ....
If all elementary schools were equally effective cognitive inequality among
sixth graders would decline less than 3 percent. If all high schools were
equally effective, cognitive inequality among twelfth graders would hardly
decline at all, and disparities in their eventual attainment would decline
less than 1 percent. Eliminating all economic and academic obstacles to
college attendance might somewhat reduce disparities in educational attain-
ment, but the change would not be large. Furthermore, the experience of
the past 25 years suggests that even fairly substantial reductions in the range
of educational attainments do not appreciably reduce economic inequality
among adults.
id. at 255.
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of protection even if no direct benefits can presently be demonstrated.
.If nothing else, self-interest dictates such a course. As Professor Urie
Bronfenbrenner recently observed:
If the children and youth of a nation are afforded opportunity to
develop their capacities to the fullest, if they are given the knowl-
edge to understand the world and the wisdom to change it, then
the prospects for the future are bright. In contrast, a society which
neglects its children, however well it may function in other re-
spects, risks eventual disorganization and demise.52
But even if the emphasis of education reform were to shift to more
direct concern for the total health development and general welfare of
children while they are in school, it is difficult to envision what role, if
any, the judiciary should assume. As a practical matter, courts will al-
ways be limited by their inherently passive nature; they cannot direct
reform openly, but can only respond to the cases brought before them.
Because their primary function is the resolution of specific cases and
controversies in an adversary context, their view on an issue is for the
most part limited to whatever the parties present in evidence. Courts
therefore are generally not in a position to examine fully the factual
bases for most policy determinations-at least in comparison to legisla-
tures which have broad investigative powers or to school boards which
oversee school activity on a regular basis.
The scope of possible judicial remedies is also limited-again, at least
in comparison to the panoply of possible actions available to a legislature.
Certain education reforms therefore seem clearly beyond the scope of
judicial competence. Consider the issue of resource allocation. While it
is true that rich districts tend to spend more on education than poor
ones, many poor families live in rich districts and vice versa. Therefore
expenditures on rich and poor children do not differ as much as one
might expect. For each $1000 difference in two families' incomes, their
districts' average expenditure per pupil will only differ by an average
of about $7.50 per year.5 Overall, the richest fifth of all families have
their children in schools that spend about 20 percent more than the
schools serving the poorest fifth.54 As the Jencks study noted, "[i]n a
country where the top fifth of all families receive 800 to 1,000 percent
more income than the bottom fifth, the fact that children from these
same families attend schools whose expenditures differ by only 20 per-
cent seems like a triumph of egalitarianism." 55
52U. BRONFENBRENNER, Two WoRLus oF CHILDHOOD, U.S. AND U.S.S.R. 3 (1970).
53 C. JE2cKs, supra note 26, at 27.
541d.
55 Id.
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There is a greater discrepancy, however, if one looks at lifetime ex-
penditures. Today only about 20 percent of the population graduates
from college, 56 and a very high percentage of these graduates come from
middle or upper income families. In 1967, for example, 87 percent of all
high school graduates whose families earned $15,000 or more entered
college as compared to only 20 percent of those whose parents earned
less than $3,000. 57 When the total lifetime amount spent per person is
examined, America spends roughly twice as much on the children of the
rich as on the children of the poor,58 clearly a much larger disparity than
occurs between school districts. On the other hand, lifetime expenditures
hardly seem amenable to the equalization decree remedy sought in the
Serrano-type cases unless courts want to force people to stay in school.
A better solution, for example, would be to charge the beneficiaries of
this public subsidy. The Jencks report suggests a surcharge on the in-
come tax of those who go to school beyond 16. 59 The largest inequalities
in resource allocation in short appear to require solutions that courts are
not competent to provide.
Yet cataloguing the limitations of judicial action does not foreclose
the issue. Certainly intervention is appropriate when a statute or regula-
tion is not being implemented by public school authorities, or when
those authorities act in violation of a constitutionally protected right. As
Justice Jackson stated in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette: 60
The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects
the citizen against the State itself, and all of its creatures-Boards of
Education not excepted. These have, of course, important, delicate,
and highly discretionary functions, but none that they may not
perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights. That they are edu-
cating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous protection
of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to
strangle the free mind at its source and teach youth to discount
important principles of our government as mere platitudes. 6'
Many current school problems, however, do not appear to stem from
violations by school officials of specific statutory or constitutional duties
5 6 Id. at 19.
57 Id. at 19-20.
58 Id. at 27.
59 Id. at 39.
60 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
611d. at 637. In Barnette, the Court upheld the right of children of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses not to salute the flag, based on first and fourteenth amendment grounds. Id. at
639-42.
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so much, as from the structure of governance which generally denies
parents and students an effective voice in the way schools are run.
With older students, then, the judiciary should provide increased pro-
tection of their first amendment and due process rights.62 A beginning
was made in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict63 where the Supreme Court upheld the right of students to wear
arm bands in protest of the Vietnam War. The Court stated:
Where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would "materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained .... State-op-
erated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism. 4
One problem with this holding is that the "material disruption" test is so
vague that it can be invoked in most situations by school officials.
Tinker, therefore, has proved to provide little protection of student
rights. Furthermore, direct protection of "individual rights" seems a
foolish concept when young children are at issue.
A more promising approach at least where young children are involved
would be fresh judicial support for parental rights in education to serve
as a counterweight to the almost unchecked power now possessed by
state and local officials to operate schools. In theory, parents presently
may "participate" by taking their suggestions or grievances to their
local school board or state legislature. But because enormous amounts of
time, energy, and money are required to change schools by this process,
in practice only relatively affluent parents retain any effective voice in
their children's education by virtue of their ability to move, if necessary,
to districts with better public schools or to afford private schools.
62 Moststudent rights cases of late have involved the question of whether schools may
forbid long hair on male students. There is a conflict among the courts of appeals at
present. Students have prevailed in two and lost in three. Compare Crews v. Cloncs,
432 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1970) (fourteenth amendment liberty protects student) and
Richards v. Thruston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970) (fourteenth amendment
liberty) 'with Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 262 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1032 (1972) (school regulations do not implicate basic constitutional values) and Jack-
son v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970) (first
amendment, procedural due process satisfied) and Ferrell v. Dallas Independent School
Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 703 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 856 (1968) (first amendment,
substantive and procedural due process satisfied). Hair length hardly seems a vital issue
in terms of fundamental school reform so it is not clear whether one should be en-
couraged or discouraged by the controversy which it has engendered to date.
63 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
64 Id. at 509-11.
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Imagining the specific form of support which the judiciary might pro-
vide is more difficult. Protecting the right of individual families to ex-
clude their child from a course they find particularly objectionable
could quickly get out of hand. Protecting the rights of a sizeable group
of families is perhaps more feasible. For example, what if 40 percent of
the parents in a particular school and 30 percent in two others would
prefer to have their children taught by the Montessori method rather
than the "traditional classroom approach" in current use? If school of-
ficials arbitrarily refused to make the administrative changes required to
convert one building to the Montessori approach, should the court agree
to intervene on behalf of the children and parents? Should a court inter-
vene if these same parents and children left the ppblic system, formed a
"private" Montessori school, and requested the share of public funds
which would otherwise have been spent on those children in public
school?
Such interventions might at first seem to exceed the limits of the
prudent use of judicial power. Yet such judicial protection of parental
rights may be the only approach which can protect children against
abuses which are now "too small" for public policy but nevertheless of
major importance in the development of a particular child. For example,
a child languishing in a school with a traditional curriculum or the class-
room of a teacher who reinforces the child's own fears of being inept
or incompetent might improve rapidly simply by being moved to a
different school or teacher. No operational structure will prevent all
abuses, of course; but placing somewhat greater reliance on the judg-
ment of a child's own parents should generally be not only as good but
often better than the present arrangement which matches most children
and schools on the very impersonal basis of residence."
There is some judicial precedent for protecting parental rights in edu-
cation, though it may prove insufficient to justify the hypothetical inter-
ventions raised above. In Meyer v. Nebraska," the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional a statute which prohibited teaching modem foreign
languages to any student who had not yet passed the eighth grade. The
Court acknowledged that at least three rights were at issue: 1) the occu-
pation rights of modem language teachers, 2) the opportunities of pupils
65 The federal government has begun testing a program in San Jose, California, in
which parents are allowed to choose between different public elementary schools. See
A P oposF EXPEmMENT NT EDUCATION VoUcHEs (OEO No. 3400 N-I, 1971). Assuming
the program survives the dismanteling of OEO this spring, we may at last have some
specific information on what choices different parents will make if they are provided
with both information about the schools and the right to select which schools their
children will attend.
66 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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to acquire knowledge, and 3) the power of parents to control the educa-
tion of their own children.67 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of
Sisters,68 the Court struck down an Oregon statute which required all
students to attend public schools. Although the plaintiffs were private
schools, the Court again spoke of the rights of parents and children in
holding that "[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all gov-
ernments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State
to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from
public teachers only." 69 More recent protection is found in the 1965
decision of Griswold v. Connecticut:."
The right to educate a child in a school of the parents' choice-
whether public or private or parochial-is [not mentioned in the
Constitution] .... Nor is the right to study any particular subject
or any foreign language. Yet the First Amendment has been con-
strued to include certain of those rights.
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters ... the right to educate one's
children as one chooses is made applicable to the States by force
of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v. Nebraska
... the same dignity is given the right to study the German lan-
guage in a private school. In other words, the State may not, con-
sistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract the
spectrum of available knowledge.... [W]e reaffirm the principle
of the Pierce and Meyer cases.71
When Pierce was decided, no attention was focused on the fact that
the "right" to choose nonpublic schools was meaningless to poor families.
More recently, courts have extended protection to the poor when cer-
tain "fundamental rights" were at issue. If Pierce were held to involve
such a "fundamental right," then the hypothetical interventions raised
above might be more appropriate.
The only recent case to challenge the power of the state to dictate
the scope of education by virtue of compulsory attendance laws is Wis-
consin v. Yoder.72 In Yoder the Court was willing to exempt Amish
children from attending school after the eighth grade. The Court em-
phasized that the Amish had sustained the burden of demonstrating the
671 d. at401.
68 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
69 Id. at 535. See also Farrington v Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298-99 (1927) (invalidating
a Hawaii statute on the ground that it deprived parents a fair opportunity to procure
for their children instruction which the parents thought important).
70 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71 Id. at 482-83.
72 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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adequacy of their mode of continuing informal education in terms of
precisely those interests that the state had advanced in support of its
program of compulsory education. 78 The Court seemed impressed by
the Amish record which showed that "[i]ts members are productive and
very law-abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in any
of its usual modern forms." 74 Thus, despite language which might seem
to support less drastic challenges to compulsory attendance laws75-re-
quests for alternative forms of formal education as opposed to total ex-
emption from public school-the opinion does not indicate support for
future challenges to state control over the style or content of public
schooling. In the Court's words, "[i]t cannot be over-emphasized that
we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group
claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more en-
lightened process for rearing children for modern life." 71
CONCLUSION
It undoubtedly will be difficult for courts to try to grapple with
the elements that really affect the quality of education available to a
child. These elements are bound to be less identifiable and less measur-
able than the input dollars challenged in Rodriguez or the racial balance
of students and teachers. Perhaps such efforts are ultimately too elusive
for judicial protection. But at the least, the judiciary has an obligation
to make clear that its interventions in education to date are wide of the
mark. The illusion of progress must be unmasked if the real work is to
begin.
73 Id. at 235.
74 Id. at 222.
7lId. at 214. The Court further stated:
[A] state's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is
not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other funda-
mental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the traditional interests of
parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long ar
they, in the words of. Pierce, 'prepare [them] for additional obligations.'
Id.
76 Id. at 235.
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